Commentary. Sodere Peace Talks: Continuity and Change

by M.Bali

Once again, hopes are being raised of achieving peace and restoring civil order in Somalia, as the Sodere-based coalition attempts to parachute its political designs by holding the upcoming conference in Bosaaso in November. Solving Somalia's political crisis by some of those who engineered it seems both surrealistic and baffling.

Throughout this year, the news headlines on Somalia's crisis disproportionately involved the series of meetings held in the Ethiopian town of Sodere, and the possible venues of succeeding conferences. Resembling the old SRC of the 1970's electing a leader, Sodere brought together over 25 factions, each consisting of nothing more than a convenient acronym, solely established to have its leaders elected to some offices.

If the Sodere ended with one thing - a promise to hold another, which is the most memorable achievements those conferences seemed to accomplish - the next one, whether held in Bosaaso or in elsewhere, will most likely yield yet another promise for another meeting elsewhere. Why do these conferences are doomed to fail? Seeking possible answers forces observers to go back, at least, to the beginnings of the drama - the demise of the Barre regime and the rise of the Manifesto Group politics.

As the military government was crumbling, prominent political and business figures both within the government, and mostly outside of it, rose to challenge the decaying regime in order to protect their parochial interests through the shaping of the future power structure of Somalia. Their choice as "interim" president was businessman Ali Mahdi, who has since remained at the forefront of the struggle of resuscitating the manifesto spirit. Despite the emergence of new factions on the political scene, and the holding of numerous conferences since, the political situation in Somalia remains today as it was in 1991 - how to breathe life into the dismembered Somalia through the establishment of a central rule presided over by the Manifesto Group.

The political deadlock between the supporters of the manifesto-type politics, those who are seeking other political and military means in establishing a political center (i.e. the SNA-based government in south Mogadishu), and those who are content with the status quo (i.e. Somaliland), is, clearly, over fundamental differences in governance. The central issues are land and power and, as a result of the civil war, the two have become inseparable. Before the civil war, the power was concentrated at the political center; namely, the capital, and whoever controlled the capital held court over the political affairs of the whole country. However, the civil war changed the situation completely.

Coming on the heels of the demise of the political center was the total localization of Somali politics. Each locality contained a fiercely independent people, who were unyielding to the calls of instituting a new political structure, with the center controlled by the competing groups and their armed factions. Most Somalis now shun all but the most limited government under their own control, cherishing their freedom to the point of anarchy. Oblivious to this reality, the Manifesto camp sought to replicate the exhausted regime, albeit one with three times the size of its cabinet. That was in 1991, but 1997 is not much different either.

Now, with the departure of UNOSOM, the major difference is the growing influence of Ethiopia as a power broker in the peace talks. Serving as a local proxy power for the West and a representative of the ineffectual OAU, Ethiopia's role is to push for the establishment of a friendly central authority that will fill the governmental vacuum and will curb the growing influence of the Islamist groups there.

However, it is becoming apparent that Ethiopia's intervention has become the lightning rod for the groups who oppose the participation in those talks. Just as the UN interventions had failed to impose a political settlement, the Ethiopia's role will likely backfire. Few Somalis, particularly those not directly connected with the contending factions, believe foreign involvement is the obvious way to resolve the crisis.

If the past is any guide to the future, any foreign intervention driven by determination that the dismembered country remain undivided, whatever the popular will, is doomed to failure. Moreover, Ethiopia's unpopularity in Somalia and Somaliland means it cannot assume a political role, and the failure of the Sodere talks to substantially break the political deadlock means it has no real breakthroughs to exploit.